We examine the welfare properties of surplus maximization by embedding a perfectly discriminating monopoly in an otherwise standard Arrow-Debreu economy. Although we discover an inefficient equilibrium, we validate partial equilibrium intuition by showing: (i) that equilibria are efficient provided that the monopoly goods are costly, and (ii) that a natural monopoly can typically use personalized two-part tariffs in these equilibria.
1. INTRODUCTION SOME ECONOMISTS ARGUE that the production of natural monopolies should be regulated, while others, such as Demsetz (1968) , argue that publicly owned or regulated firms waste resources, and so monopoly rights should be auctioned.
Both groups agree, however, that the correct social goal for the natural monopoly is to maximize the sum of producer and consumer surplus in its market. This paper explores whether this consensus is warranted. To do so, we examine the welfare consequences of an idealized perfectly discriminating monopoly (PDM), and ask if anything is lost when it maximizes surplus in its own market without regard to other markets. The efficiency of perfect price discrimination is considered well-established, but we note that the existing proofs typically use partial equilibrium arguments that often depend upon convexity and that do not account for interactions with other markets or for the circular flow of income.
These arguments leave open questions about both efficiency and distribution.
For instance, can inefficiency arise from a PDM destroying surplus in another market in the course of creating surplus in its own, as can happen in monopolis-tic competition?2 Or, leaving efficiency aside, does surplus maximization in a single market limit over-all distributional flexibility? Such questions create a call for a general equilibrium analysis of perfect price discrimination under increasing returns, particularly given the many examples of inefficiencies and decentralization problems found in the recent increasing returns literature.3
This paper therefore introduces a new general equilibrium concept-a perfectly discriminating monopoly equilibrium. Our economy has many price-taking firms that produce competitive goods sold at linear prices. There is also a PDM that produces monopoly goods, and that uses or produces these competitive goods. The PDM treats household incomes and the prices of competitive goods as constant, and sets individualized nonlinear tariffs for the monopoly goods in order to maximize profits. These profits are measured in accounting units whose value is tied down by the equilibrium prices of competitive goods. Households receive incomes calculated according to equilibrium prices and profits, and just as in an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium, they maximize utility treating their incomes and the prices they pay as constant.
The fact that our PDM treats incomes and some prices as fixed differs from many general equilibrium models of imperfect competition in which large firms treat little or nothing as fixed (see, e.g., Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) , Grodal (1984) , and Bohm (1994) ). In many cases, our approach seems realistic: for example, a local telephone company may set prices in telephone service, but take the price of labor or telephone wire as given. Our approach also has a methodological justification: in order to better understand the impact of industry surplus maximization on related markets and to test the robustness of partial equilibrium analysis, it makes sense not to abandon all of the partial equilibrium assumptions at once. An incidental advantage of our approach is that it removes the dependence of equilibria on the normalization rule.
Our analysis reveals that it is possible for a PDM equilibrium to be inefficient, but that all PDM equilibria are efficient when the monopoly goods are costly.
On the other hand, we find that some optima cannot be decentralized when the monopoly has increasing returns. This reveals a tension between surplus maximization and fulfilling certain social objectives. Decentralization can fail for reasons other than the lack of sufficient willingness-to-pay found in the regulatory literature on two-part tariffs (see Vohra (1990) , Quinzii (1992) , and Brown, Heller, and Starr (1992) ). Too much willingness-to-pay at other allocations can 2In monopolistic competition with linear pricing, Spence (1976) writes that, ... when a product is introduced it affects other firms' profits ... Since the entering firm does not take these effects into account, it may enter when it is not generating a net social benefit. 3For examples of inefficiencies under increasing returns with first-order conditions satisfied, see Guesnerie (1975) , Brown and Heal (1979) , Beato and Mas-Colell (1983) , or more recently Vohra (1990) or Brown, Heller, and Starr (1992) . For an old discussion of some such inefficiencies see Coase (1946) . For a discussion of decentralization failures, see Vohra (1990) , Quinzii (1992) , and Brown, Heller, and Starr (1992) . PERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 901 DEFINITION 1: (Rz*),(Rf*)fn (X/?*) (yf*)p* x 9Yc is said to be a PDM equilibrium for the ec incomes II'* ? Ef m 0f(Ap* yf*-Rf*) + 0Ilm(>3lRIz* ? >31 j ,nRf* ? p* y tn*) Vh, 1. ((X'n* RIl*),(Ytf*, Rf* )f m y YC*) solves [M] ; 2. UIZ(xIl*) = VIl(xlz*, 11* -p*)>V(O I/Z*p*)Vh; 3* p*. f* =Hf(yf* p*)and p* .yc* Rf* >HTf(Op *), Vf#=Am; and 4. x* = +y*.
Just as in an Arrow-Debreu economy, the monopoly takes household incomes and competitive prices as constant instead of doing general equilibrium forecasting. This behavioral assumption is reasonable for many firms, and even when it is not entirely appropriate, the assumption seems a sensible step for examining the robustness of partial equilibrium conclusions about profit maximization with price discrimination. Our monopoly's myopia distinguishes our equilibrium concept from those of Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) and the many subsequent general equilibrium papers which assume that imperfect competitors anticipate all price changes. These models engender controversy since it's not clear how a firm should compare profits when relative prices differ. The arbitrariness of such comparisons leads some authors to assert that any interior real allocation can be an equilibrium for some comparison rule (see Bohm (1990, p. 2 
)). It is worth
noting that in our model, the prices of competitive goods pin down the meaning of profits and the equilibrium is independent of the normalization rule in that if K(RIZ* (Rf ** )f , i I(xh*) (f) p* ) is a PDM equilibrium, then so is K( aRI* (axRf )f (X 1'*)7 (Yf), a p*, )Va > 0. We claim that KR = 1, x = (1, 0), y = (1, -1), PC = 1) is a PDM equilibrium. I this equilibrium, monopoly profits are H1= R +pcyc = 1 -1 = 0 and househol income is I = PC wc + H = 1. The monopoly cannot increase profits because eve though it could costlessly increase production, the household can't afford to pay more, and the monopoly takes the household's income as given.
The reader can check that the unique Pareto optimum x = (2, 0), y = (2, -1) is part of another equilibrium with profits of 1 depicted in Figure 3 .1, Panel B. As profits fall from 1 to 0, the reservation utility level V(O,n, wc + H1) falls so that the example admits equilibria with consumption plans ranging from (2,0) to (1, 0) . This continuum of equilibria may remind readers of the indeterminacy of equilibria in previous general equilibrium models of imperfect competition (see Bohm (1994) and Grodal (1984) PROOF: Let (F-1) hold and K(RI*) (Rf*) m,(XIz*),(yf*),p*) be an equilibrium. We show that the allocation (xI*), (Mf) must be efficient by arguing that any Pareto superior allocation (xSI),(5f) must be infeasible, because if it were feasible, then the monopoly could make higher profits than in the equilibrium.
Step 1: If ("),(yf) were feasible, the strategy s (("I IRR ),(yf jf)f*m'Sc where RI -R"* + p* (x"* -i1) and Rf Rf* +p* (p5/-y/*), would be least as profitable as the equilibrium strategy.
The offer (xm, RR) is acceptable to each household h, because xi' is affordable (it costs the same as xIl* did) and yields at least the utility of x"*, w must in turn yield at least the reservation utility since xIl* was chosen in equilibrium. The offer is acceptable to each competitive firm f because I-if(Ym4 7 p* ) > ps*. yf f + P*C -Yc*Rf2Rf+7( m7p* Step 2: The monopoly could strictly increase profits from s by offering less of the monopoly goods or increasing the charge to some household.
Let h' be a household strictly better off.
Case A. il' > OC* Then, for sufficiently small ?, the monopoly can make mor profit by offering (x , RI' + e) and otherwise leaving ^s unchanged.
Case B: Xc =OC. Then, iXM > OM since UI'(xi')> U'(xu'*). The monopoly cannot increase its charge since the household is already spending its entire income on the monopoly goods. The monopoly can, however, take advantage of the household's strict preference for x 1 by decreasing sales to h'. Condition This theorem validates the partial equilibrium conclusion that perfect price discrimination is generally efficient: PDM equilibria are only inefficient if the monopoly cannot reduce cost by cutting output. Our efficiency argument differs from the standard competitive argument in Arrow (1951) because in our model the set of preferred bundles is not separated from the production possibility set by a hyperplane. As we will see in Section 4.1, these sets are separated by the monopoly's isoprofit set, a nonlinear hypersurface. Vohra (1990, pp. 429-432) , Quinzii (1992, pp. 36-42) , and Brown, Heller, and Starr (1992, pp. 67-69) all provide examples of economies with increasing returns for which Pareto optima cannot be decentralized as two-part tariff equilibria. In each case, there is too little willingness to pay to run the regulated monopoly, so these optima also cannot be decentralized as PDM equilibria.6'7
Failures of Decentralization and Existence
In fact, no PDM equilibrium exists in these economies.
One might conjecture that the existence and decentralization problems of our equilibrium notion would disappear in economies with sufficient willingness-topay, as they do for the two-part tariff equilibria of Brown, Heller, and Starr (1992) . However, the following example has a unique Pareto optimum which cannot be decentralized as a PDM equilibrium, not because it has inadequate surplus, but because some other production plan, one with even more surplus, attracts the monopoly. The example also shows that equilibria may not exist, though we leave it to the reader to check nonexistence for this case.8'9 5Note that pc* s Oc since preferences are strictly monotonic.
6
In Vohra's example, firm 2 (the natural monopoly) produces a perfect substitute for the good of firm 1. Firm 2's average cost lies above firm l's marginal and average cost when firm 1 produces little or nothing, but below firm l's marginal and average cost when firm 1 produces a lot. Consequently, if only firm 2 produces, it loses money since it must price below the price of firm 1, and if only firm 1 produces, the price for (and cost of) firm l's goods rise enough to attract firm 2's entry. Even though it may be efficient for firm 2 to produce alone, there is insufficient willingness to pay because of the competition offered by firm l's good. 7These authors restrict attention to individualized two-part tariffs, but Theorem 4.1 shows that if the monopoly cannot cover its costs using such tariffs, it cannot do so with any pricing scheme.
Slf (F-1) held, then nonexistence would follow from the facts that: (i) the unique Pareto optimum cannot be decentralized, and (ii) all PDM equilibria are efficient when (F-1) holds. 9Our model does not address what happens when some agent tries to maximize surplus and no equilibrium exists, but one can easily imagine that this would lead to inefficiencies and a sort of refutation of the notion that perfect price discrimination is efficient. =(0,9,9) and utility U(xl,x2,x3) =x/2x/2 +4x1, a monopoly with production set Y = ((0, 0, 0), (1, -5,0),(2, -7.01, -7)1 _ 93 , and no competitive firms.
Note that U(1, 4, 9) = 10 > U(2, 1.99, 2) = 9.99 > U(0, 9, 9) = 9. Hence, the unique Pareto optimum is y = (1, -5, 0), x = (1, 4,9).
Supporting the consumption (1,4,9) in a decentralization of the optimum requires that P2/P3 = 9/4, so w.l.o.g. let p, = (9,4). Because the P extract the full surplus in equilibrium, the household must have income I such that U(1, 4, 9) = V(0, I, P). Hence, I equals 120 = min pc xC subject to U(0, x = 10. Finally, the monopoly charge must be R = I-pc XC = 120 -(9,4) . (4,9) = 48, yielding profits of 48 + pc yc = 3. The reader can check that Kx = (1, 4, 9), R = 48, y = (1, -5, ), pc = (9, 4)) satisfies equilibrium conditions 2-4. However, it does not satisfy condition 1, since the offer (x,,, = 2, R = 96) is acceptablel0 and the strategy K(xm = 2, R = 96), yc = (-7.01, -7)) can be produced, and yields profits of 4.91 = 96 -(9 x 7.01 + 4 x 7)> 3. Consequently, the Pareto optimum cannot be decentralized as a PDM equilibrium. The monopoly wants to produce the extra unit of output because the household's willingness to pay is high and the cost of producing the extra unit is low, lower in fact than would be possible if the technology were convex.11
ISO-PROFIT SETS AND TWO-PART TARIFFS
This section explores more thoroughly what it means for a PDM to maximize profits. In particular, we characterize a PDM's iso-profit sets together with the set of production plans that yield higher profits than in some candidate equilibrium. This analysis provides a geometric understanding of the results in the previous section. It also helps us generalize the finding in the partial equilibrium literature (see, e.g., Oi (1971) ) that a monopoly can perfectly discriminate by charging individualized hookup fees plus a uniform per-unit price equal to marginal cost.
Iso-Profit Sets
In a competitive economy, an iso-profit set consists of production plans yielding identical profits at given prices p, i.e., {ylp . y = constant). In contra PDM's iso-profit set depends on both the competitive prices and household incomes. Given prices pc > Oc and incomes (II), it can be written as We next use Lemma 1 to characterize Q+, the set of production plans that would yield the monopoly higher profits than it gets in a "candidate equilibrium." DEFINITION 2: K(R/*.), (Rf* )f + m M (xI* ), (Yf * ), p> is said to be a candida equilibrium if conditions (2), (3), and (4) from Definition 1 are satisfied given incomes Rh* -RIl* + P* x* Vh, and if pc* -f* Rf* -Ilf(OmPc) V f m.
A candidate equilibrium differs from an equilibrium in two ways. First, the monopoly problem may not be solved, and second, the candidate equilibrium may implicitly involve redistribution, since R h* +px* .Xh* could differ fro pay to make the monopoly want to increase output. Similarly, to tempt the monopoly to lower output, its marginal cost must rise as it lowers output faster than marginal willingness to pay does. Decentralization problems occur when the increasing returns in producing the monopoly goods are so dramatic that they overwhelm the decreasing returns of households and competitive firms in using these goods.
Two-Part Tariffs
Although take-it-or-leave-it offers give a PDM maximum flexibility, this section demonstrates that two-part tariffs are usually sufficient. In fact, a PDM can generally maximize profits using a two-part tariff with a uniform per-unit price equal to marginal cost so that all discrimination occurs through hookup charges. The intuition behind this result is that if buyers' marginal valuations differ from each other, then the monopoly can profit by adjusting its marketing strategy without changing its production plan, and if these valuations differ from marginal cost, then the monopoly can profit by changing its production level.
We follow the literature in using the Clarke normal cone to generalize marginal cost for nonconvex and nonsmooth technologies. (See, e.g., Khan and Vohra (1987) and Brown (1991) .) This cone reduces to the standard normal cone for convex sets. for all sequences yq __ ym, where yq E yim, and sequences tq -0,
where tq E (0, cx,) , yq + tq(zm , zc) E Ym for q sufficiently large.
If some monopoly good is produced at ym E Ym, assumption (F-1)' says that there is a nonzero rate of trading off this good for competitive goods, and that this tradeoff is possible both at and near ylf. This assumption is stronger than (F-1) , and eliminates the sort of technology depicted in Figure 4 .3, ensuring that the monopoly goods are costly at the margin. PROPOSITION 4: A PDM equilibrium exists in E if some equilibrium in E has sufficient willingness to pay for k.
PROOF: See Edlin, Epelbaum, and Heller (1996) . Q.E.D.
Such existence results would not hold under linear pricing, as Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977) show.
Discussion
The previous two subsections are closely related to important special cases from the regulatory two-part tariff literature. Vohra (1990, Section 5) showed that in economies with only two goods (a monopoly good and a competitive good), there exists an efficient regulated two-part-tariff equilibrium if the technology is of the pure fixed cost type. Moriguchi (1996) has shown under a willingness-tIo-pay assumption that there exists an efficient regulated two-parttariff equilibrium for pure fixed cost economies. To show the existence of a PDM equilibrium in the fixed cost case, we likewise needed a willingness-to-pay assumption; our assumption was over a smaller set of potential equilibria, but for this we "paid" by making an added assumption about endowments (F-4).
One might hope that Theorem 4.1 would allow us to compare more directly our results with Vohra's and Moriguchi's since it asserts that a PDM can typically charge two-part tariffs. However, the income distribution differs between regulated and deregulated models. In the regulatory models, the monopoly makes no profit, and so to convert a PDM equilibrium into a regulated equilibrium, we would need to lower each household's hookup by its share in monopoly profits. This process might yield hookups of various signs, however, which would violate Vohra's equilibrium definition. (Vohra emphasizes that an equilibrium definition should not admit hookups of different signs, since that would allow wealth redistribution.) Consequently, the allocation in a PDM equilibrium can frequently only be supported as a two-part-tariff equilibrium with transfers. Likewise, transfers are typically required to convert a regulated equilibrium into a PDM equilibrium. Since the monopoly is typically not extracting all surplus in a regulated equilibrium, hookups must be raised for the conversion, and in order to keep consumption unchanged, the monopoly's new profits must be distributed so that each household receives a dividend equal to the increase in that household's hookup. Even with wealth redistribution, not all two-part tariff equilibria can be decentralized as PDM equilibria, since they may not be compatible with profit maximization. In the fixed cost case, those with positive production will be comparable, however, and this observation provides one way to check the efficiency of such regulated equilibria.23 23To show this fact, one need only increase hookups, distribute shares as described, and t argue that the resulting candidate equilibrium is a PDM equilibrium (see Edlin (1993) ).
To summarize, despite the close connections between the known cases where PDM equilibria and regulated two-part tariff equilibria exist and are efficient, these cases are not strictly comparable. Perhaps this fact should not be surprising because the distribution of income differs between the models.
COMPARISONS WITH THE LITERATURE
This paper found that surplus maximization in monopoly markets is usually efficient in equilibrium, even when the surplus in other markets is ignored. This validates the partial equilibrium result that perfect price discrimination is efficient. Moreover, perfect price discrimination usually can be accomplished with discriminatory two-part tariffs with a uniform per-unit tariff equal to marginal cost.
Our paper has developed a new general equilibrium concept for economies with increasing returns, and we conclude with a few remarks about the relationship between our equilibrium concept and previous general equilibrium concepts. As depicted in Figure 6 .1, tradeoffs arise between the efficiency of a given type of equilibria and its distributional flexibility. Competitive equilibria, for instance, are always efficient, but Pareto optima frequently cannot be decentralized when there are increasing returns. At the other extreme, Pareto optima can always be decentralized as marginal-cost-pricing equilibria, but these equilibria are frequently inefficient, and for some ownership distributions are always inefficient. PDM equilibria lie between these two extremes: they are typically efficient, but more optima can be decentralized as PDM equilibria than as competitive equilibria because Q+ lies above the competitive iso-profit set.
Regulated two-part-tariff equilibria allow still more optima to be decentralized, but like marginal-cost-pricing equilibria, these equilibria are not always efficient, and for some distributions of ownership are never efficient.
In Figure 6 .1, it appears that marginal-cost-pricing equilibria dominate twopart-tariff equilibria since marginal-cost-pricing equilibria allow more distributional flexibility without any apparent efficiency disadvantage. (See Edlin and Epelbaum (1994) for details.) This may, however, be a figment of the fact that the efficiency axis in the figure has only three groupings. A finer order for efficiency might reveal some advantages of two-part-tariff equilibria. One such ordering might be the inclusive order on the sets of economies for which all equilibria are efficient. After all, the inclusive order orders competitive equilibria and PDM equilibria. We do not know whether such an order or any other order reveals advantages of two-part-tariff equilibria, but this seems a fertile area for future research. Similarly, one may wonder whether there exists an equilibrium concept with a reasonable interpretation that dominates our concept by retaining good efficiency properties while adding distributional flexibility. We conjecture that this is possible because the iso-profit set, 8Q+, generally lies strictly below the set ZBh -Ef# myf 
